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2SUMMARY
Regions are an old concept in geography but
new in common parlance in Hungary. Like
districts, they are contiguous areas of land, but
the basis of them is often not natural or his-
torical, but provided by the administration of
state. The official, legal division of Hungary
into regions took place in the 1990s. The ex-
pression became widely known in Hungary
because intra-state regions play a very strong
role in the European Union (EU), where men-
tion is often made of a ‘Europe of regions’ and
efforts made to even the regional economic
inequalities, including sizeable financial ones.
In Hungary there have been debates about the
concept and employment of regions, due to
poor definition and uncertainty about the ex-
istence, borders and intra-state role of regions.
The change of system brought transfor-
mations and reorganizations that produced a
number of new regional processes and phe-
nomena.
The state-socialist economy declined al-
most overnight as a result of the change of
system. Hitherto ‘developed industrial areas’
found themselves suffering grave economic
and employment crises. Many state-owned
enterprises and other business organizations
still competitive on Western markets despite
outmoded equipment and technologies faced
immediate insolvency. Others converted into
companies and/or were privatized, in some
cases becoming wholly foreign-owned. Most
of the peasant-owned agricultural land under
state socialism had been farmed collectively by
cooperatives. It became possible during the
transformation to withdraw such land (or
land received under compensation schemes)
from the cooperatives. Mainly for political
reasons, assets of large-scale agricultural con-
cerns and cooperatives were paid out as com-
pensation, divided up or scattered, so that
most of them ceased operating. As a result,
more than half the country’s farmland came
to be divided into holdings too small for mod-
ern farming methods to be employed.
The regional consequence was the
emergence of crisis regions, with a surge of
unemployment and impoverishment. The re-
sulting territorial inequalities have become
apparent in living conditions, including in-
frastructural provisions and availability of
public services. Naturally, privatization and
the subsequent extension of the private sector
and arrival of foreign investment were con-
centrated in territories (counties, regions,
towns, etc.) where the conditions of operation
were the most favourable.
Stronger market forces and economic
competition strengthened the processes differ-
entiating and selecting within the economy
and the regulation supporting those processes.
The post-transformation recession affected
different parts of the country to different ex-
tents. Districts dominated by weak territorial
structures and crisis industries became the
losers by the change of system and the regions
with diversified structures the winners.
The change of system heightened the
differences between centre and periphery. The
differences in economic potential between
Budapest and the provinces have grown.
Building up the market economy has benefited
developed areas, especially Budapest, more
than backward areas. The spatial differences
in production are far exceeded by the differ-
ences between Budapest and the provinces in
income and capital accumulation.
With Hungary’s accession to the EU im-
minent (and with its present associate status),
there are two focuses for reorganizing the
system of public administration that operates
at present.
1. The Hungarian counties (dating back a
thousand years, as mentioned already) are
too small to exercise every potential inte-
gration function and force. They are also
too small to meet EU size criteria for sub-
national units. Their size would be an ob-
stacle to them being treated as single units
within the EU administration. Hungarian
counties have an average population of
500,000 and area of 5000 sq. km, as
against average sizes for EU regions that far
exceed these figures.
2. The developmental autonomy of counties in
Hungary and financial opportunities open
to them are extremely limited. The major
decisions about county developments are
taken nationally (albeit at the instigation of
the country) and largely financed out of the
central budget. The county authority’s own
revenues are insufficient to perform the
county’s immediate tasks, let alone to fi-
nance developments. Statutory tasks are fi-
nanced by transfers from the central
budget calculated according to normative
costs.
The solution is seemingly simple.
1. A system of local government has to be cre-
ated by merging counties, three to a region.
(Proto-regions already exist in terms of EU
administration, but otherwise only in a
formal sense.)
2. A much higher proportion of the budgetary
revenues deriving from counties (regions)
has to be turned into county (regional)
revenues, to provide the vitally important
financial basis for self-government.
However, these ostensibly simple solu-
tions are by no means simply to apply.
First, there is a historically evolved ap-
paratus for performing the functions of to-
day’s counties and county seats, with con-
comitant customary laws and infrastructural
provisions. What government is going to ac-
cept political responsibility for choosing one
of the three historic county seats as the re-
gional seat in a position of national sub-centre
and for demoting the other two cities? Conse-
quently, four governments since the change of
system have done only the minimum to com-
ply with the demands of the EU bureaucracy
in creating and operating Hungary’s regions.
Secondly, such financial independence
based on revenue from each region’s territory
under a requisite system of more or less uni-
form, decentralized financial sources (tax and
other revenues and scale of these) presumes
that the units will be roughly equal in devel-
opment level and capacity to generate reve-
nues. This study shows in several dimensions
that the opposite is the case in Hungary. If the
financial independence of the counties (re-
gions) rested on more or less uniform revenue
regulations, the sizeable historical differences
between comparatively rich Budapest and the
counties of Northern Transdanubia on the one
hand and the poorer counties of North Hun-
gary and the Northern Great Plain would in-
crease, not diminish. So the centralism of de-
velopment and other decisions of a structural
character, along with the financial system be-
hind it, cannot be abandoned. Roughly
speaking, the state revenues will have to be
centralized and redistributed to finance
county (regional) tasks, using various well-
chosen methods of earmarking funds, by de-
vising and applying rules agreed among all
those concerned. Of course, the taxation and
the earmarking mechanism may be well or ill-
chosen, but centralism can only give way to
decentralization slowly and steadily as the
chances arise over many years.
The authors see the following strategy
for structural change as probable in the next
five or ten years. The county system will re-
main as the operative sub-national system on
a concrete level. Lightly staffed, three-county
regions will emerge with three main func-
tions:
1. They will perform integration and organ-
izational tasks within the region and with
other regions (even regions in other coun-
tries).
2. They will act as organizers of the division
of labour among their constituent counties
(in ways regulated perhaps by statute).
Furthermore, they will represent and lobby
for regional interests in the outside world.
3. On a county level, they will prepare and
draw up the region’s projects, and repre-
sent them to the government and the EU
apparatus during the bargaining process.
5INTRODUCTION
This introduction concerns three questions
that the authors consider essential to a knowl-
edge and understanding of the present situa-
tion, dilemmas and problems to do with
transformation and Hungarian regional de-
velopment. It mentions changes in the Hun-
garian settlement pattern in the 20th century,
with a few of the features specific to it, the re-
gions – the ‘Europe of regions’ – and different
ways in which the nation-states of East-
Central Europe developed, and finally, the
history of Hungary’s units of public admini-
stration, notably the counties.
The Hungarian settlement pattern un-
derwent three significant changes in the 20th
century.1
1. Two-thirds of the Hungarian population in
the first quarter of the 20th century lived
in villages. Two-thirds at the end of the
century lived in towns.
2. The border changes after the First World
War (which will be mentioned later) frag-
mented a longstanding network of coex-
isting settlements. As a consequence of
them, Hungary lost a third of its territory
and its population shrank to less than half
(Figure 1).
3. The character of the spatial relations be-
tween village and town has altered in the
last 25 years. Previously, the settlement
network consisted of a cluster of zones of
attraction, with the towns connected to
their districts and surrounding villages.
These days the network is more complex
and dominated by the connections between
towns. Each village may be attracted to-
wards several towns, while the worst-
placed villages may lose their urban con-
nections altogether. In Hungary as in other
                                                
1 Enyedi and Horváth, eds (2002). pp. 14–17. We have
made use here of some parts of the introduction by
György Enyedi.
countries, residence and workplace func-
tions have become mixed, with many peo-
ple working in different settlements from
the ones in which they reside.
There are two other features of the Hun-
garian settlement network worth emphasiz-
ing.
1. Budapest, the capital, is the only interna-
tional metropolis in the country. It is pre-
eminent among cities not only for its
population, but for an unmatched concen-
tration of modern urban functions. The
Hungarian capital has been the impetus
behind modernization in the Carpathian
Basin for almost 200 years, as a receptor
and disseminator for technical, organiza-
tional and institutional innovations. Its 1.8
million inhabitants pay 40 per cent of the
personal income tax levied in the country.
It competes with other Central European
cities such as Vienna, Prague and to some
extent Warsaw. With Warsaw it competes
for an economic role extending beyond the
bounds of Central Europe. It will be seen
later that Budapest in the 1990s absorbed a
high proportion of the foreign investment
flowing into East-Central Europe.
2. The settlement pattern on the Great Hun-
garian Plain has two conspicuous features:
giant villages and communities of scattered
homesteads. Giant villages also occur in
certain parts of Southern Europe, such as
Sicily and Southern Spain, but the devel-
opment of them occurred in different ways.
In Hungary, the inhabitants of several vil-
lages came together for better protection in
the period of Ottoman Turkish occupation
in the 16th–17th centuries. Homestead set-
tlement is general also in parts of Northern
and North-Western Europe, where feudal-
ism broke down (in the 13th and 14th
centuries) and private peasant land own-
ership therefore developed earliest.
Regions are an old concept in geography
but new in common parlance in Hungary.
Like districts, they are contiguous areas of
land, but the basis of them is often not natural
or historical, but provided by the administra-
tion of state. The official, legal division of
Hungary into regions took place in the
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1990s.2 The expression became widely known
in Hungary because intra-state regions play a
very strong role in the European Union (EU),
where mention is often made of a ‘Europe of
regions’ and efforts made to even the regional
economic inequalities, including sizeable fi-
nancial ones. Let us say in advance here that
there have been debates in Hungary about the
concept and employment of regions, due to
poor definition and uncertainty about the ex-
istence, borders and intra-state role of regions.
Mention is made of the differences in
the way the EU (the ‘Europe of regions’) and
the Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries developed into nation-states.
The nation-states of the present-day EU
came into being successively in the 18th and
19th centuries, through integration and/or
absorption of earlier political formations
(counties, princedoms and city-states, often
with separate languages and cultures). 3 The
integration and often violent process of union,
to which some languages and cultures fell
victim, did not usually eradicate strong iden-
tities that developed historically in certain
spatial units (for instance, those of the Cata-
lans, Scots and Bavarians). The EU, embodying
integration on a sub-continental scale, has re-
vived these old units and turned such histori-
cal regions into the basis of the ‘Europe of re-
gions’. These regions have preserved the dia-
lects, customs, self-awareness, etc. of their in-
habitants through a process lasting a thousand
years.
East-Central Europe arrived at nation-
states along different historical paths. It hap-
pened not by integration, but by fragmenta-
tion or reduction of multi-ethnic empires, or
in the extreme case of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, by its breakup. These nation-states
developed in the 20th century and seem set to
continue into the 21st (in the Balkans and
perhaps in Eastern Europe). The first great
wave of nation-state creation came after the
                                                
2 Regional frameworks known as planning-economic
zones began to be employed in long-term economic
planning in the 1970s.
3 United Italy absorbed Lombardy and Sicily, united
Germany Saxony and Westphalia, and united Spain
Castille and Catalonia.
First World War, when local forces were mo-
bilized and encouraged by the geopolitical
considerations of the victorious great powers.
The map of East-Central Europe’s na-
tion-states was drawn outside, in Western
Europe.4 After the Second World War, further
important border changes were made at the
expense or to the gain of existing nation-
states, again through outside intervention by
the great powers. The second wave of post-
war nation-state creation came with the
breakup of the state-socialist system. Eight
states were replaced by 26 new nation-states
(including Soviet successor republics in Asia),
although they reflected local initiatives, power
relations and efforts, and bore the bloody
marks of local wars. One obvious consequence
for regionalism is that these nation-states lack
historical regions or possess them only excep-
tionally. For regional initiatives in the 20th
century have several times been divided by the
borders of new nation-states averse to giving
ethnic groups and historical units any kind of
administrative frontiers that might support
claims to autonomy. Changing (‘adjusting’)
administrative borders has been a ceaseless
process in CEE countries in the last few dec-
ades.
The reduced territory of Hungary after
the First World War (Figure 1) possessed an
administrative system of counties largely un-
changed for a thousand years. For the county
(vármegye) had become the basis of territorial
division when the state was founded in 997
and remained the intermediate unit of local
government until 1950.5 In the state-socialist
period (1948–89), the county authorities
were subordinated directly to the Presidential
Council (collective head of state) and the
Council of Ministers (government). After the
                                                
4 Yugoslavia, for instance, came into being without ever
having existed before.
5 Its origin is disputed. It probably developed into a
uniquely Hungarian institution based on earlier Slav,
Avar and Byzantine patterns. Its first form, the royal
county, arose as part of the state-organizing activity of
Stephen I, the country’s first king. Greater Hungary up
to 1920 had 63 counties, of which 30 were ceded to
other countries under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, 23
remained partly in Hungary, and only 10 counties were
unaffected. The number of counties in Hungary was
reduced in 1923 to 25.
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change of system, the counties received local-
government powers and tasks under Act
LXV/1990.6 In principle, the counties may not
receive direct funding from the central budget
other than defined normative allowances for
performing specified tasks. Governments of
settlements in turn receive normative funding
for budget allowances and maintaining and
teaching in childcare institutions, kindergar-
tens, primary and secondary schools, and usu-
ally but not invariably, possess revenues of
their own (e.g. local business taxation) to
cover county-level costs and investments.
1) THE LEGACY OF STATE SOCIALISM
State socialism in Hungary, as elsewhere,
abolished private property (apart from small
dwellings), and the property of financial and
market organizations and institutions, to pro-
duce a complete dominance of state owner-
ship. Agricultural land was distributed to the
landless, but most of this was later transferred
to collective (cooperative) farms. The eco-
nomic system it created was state-run and
centralized and aimed at autarky. This was
dominated for the first two decades by forced,
accelerated industrialization of a Stalinist type,
which gave development priority to mining,
traditional heavy industry (steel, petrochemi-
cals, heavy engineering, etc.) and the fuel
economy, while neglecting to maintain or de-
velop other areas (such as the infrastructure).
As a result, large state-owned enterprises and
                                                
6 The county government must provided set countywide
services and maintain institutions to deal with them. It
may introduce regulations on matters in its competence
and call county referenda. Its tasks and powers are ex-
ercised by a county assembly, headed by an elected
chairperson. The electorate (except in cities with
county rights) elects assembly members from two sets
of party lists, for communities with over and under
10,000 inhabitants. The number of members is 40–80
depending on population. Seats go to parties that obtain
5 per cent of the vote on both lists. The assembly is as-
sisted by a county government office headed by the
county recorder. The legality of local and county gov-
ernment activity and decisions is monitored by county
(and capital-city) public administrative offices.
industrial zones and districts were created in
Budapest, the north-east and central Transda-
nubia. Their locations were decided by central
planning, which reduced the differences of
economic development between the larger re-
gions of the country. The process also contrib-
uted to building up a network of cities, which
had not existed in the modern sense before the
Second World War. According to György Eny-
edy, ‘The settlement network was modernized
formally: the major difference in living condi-
tions in villages and towns remained, but it
was not possible for a local society resting on a
bourgeoisie and capable of self-organization
to develop. The basis of the settlement network
contained a closed, inward-looking economy
in which the enterprises – with few exceptions
– were not in direct touch with the players on
the world market.’ The counties and settle-
ments had very little room for manoeuvre or
separate decision-making competence.7
The change of system was preceded by a
long decade (1978-1989) of economic stag-
nation, except in the preferred area of tour-
ism, when the equalization process between
settlement types was halted.8 This applies es-
pecially to the quantity and quality of the in-
frastructural networks of smaller communi-
ties. For differences of standard correlated
strongly with settlement size (town, larger
village, smaller village). Surveys show clearly
that satisfactory infrastructural provisions in
Hungary are a privilege reserved for towns-
folk.
The state-socialist period and its system
of control over the economy and society led to
an approach of giving preference to centres
and eliminating grassroots, spontaneous, indi-
vidual initiative.
The infrastructural networks were in-
stalled hierarchically on a radial plan and
lacked horizontal, bilateral links or coopera-
tion. This approach was reinforced by the es-
tablished historical structure of the transport
network, in which radial links between Buda-
pest the county seats and other towns and vil-
lages were not accompanied by direct network
                                                
7 Enyedi (1996), pp. 12–17.
8 See Fleischer (1996) and Ehrlich (1995 and 1997).
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and service links between communities of
equal size. This is also reflected in the marked
differences of infrastructural provision within
the settlement hierarchy, not only in Hungary,
but in all CEE countries, for instance in te-
lephony in towns and villages. Low in any
case, telephone provision in Hungary in 1990
showed a ratio of 5:1 between Budapest and
the provinces and 7:1 between Budapest and
rural areas.9
Development was considerable in the
less technically sensitive and capital-intensive
infrastructure – education, culture, health
services and to some extent housing – even by
comparison with the economically developed
market economies in some respects. However,
these cannot be more than mentioned here.
One specific Hungarian feature was a volume
of domestic and still more foreign tourism far
greater than in other socialist countries.
As in other socialist countries, domestic
tourism was extensive and heavily subsidized,
so that it acted as a social reward for working
people. Likewise untypical of the socialist bloc
was Hungary’s inward international tourism,
which developed markedly in the last two
decades of the state-socialist period.10 Most
socialist countries suffered chronic food
shortages and generally poor supplies of
consumer goods. Hungary, largely thanks to
the 1968 ‘new economic mechanism’, man-
aged to produce a mounting agricultural sur-
plus, allowing it to increase its agricultural
exports substantially and improve supplies of
many consumer goods. This turned the coun-
try into a shopping centre mainly for people
in other socialist countries (especially ethnic
Hungarians in neighbouring countries) and to
some extent for visitors from the West, due to
the favourable consumer prices. In addition,
Hungary became a meeting place in the 1970s
for citizens of the two Germanies, whose di-
rect visits were still severely restricted. The
number of visitors from Germany, Austria and
                                                
9 Ehrlich (1992).
10 In 1961, Hungary preceded other socialist countries
in allowing citizens to travel abroad privately with a
small convertible-currency allowance every three
years, or more often if they held legally acquired con-
vertible currency of their own. There were no currency
restrictions on travel to other socialist countries.
other Western European and overseas coun-
tries increased substantially, attracted not only
by the prices, but by the albeit relative free-
dom compared with other CEE countries and
the services of a reviving small-scale private
sector.
The extensive domestic and increasing
international tourism contributed greatly to
the expansion of legal and non-legal accom-
modation services, tourism-based retail trad-
ing, catering, and under-the-counter barter,
from which locals and domestic and foreign
visitors made gains. The tourist industry that
developed and prospered in Budapest, on the
Danube Bend, at Balaton and along the West-
ern borders was partly state-owned, but to an
extent unusual for a socialist country, also
privately owned. It offered lower quality stan-
dards than in the economically developed
market economies, but it satisfied the re-
quirements of shopping tourists and mass
tourists and Germans seeking a family reun-
ion. In that respect, the development in Hun-
gary was unusual and conspicuous for East-
Central Europe. The growth of international
tourism in the 1960s and 1970s contributed
greatly to rise in unregistered income and the
standard of living among the Hungarian
population and to the state’s foreign-exchange
earnings. Perhaps more important still, the
openness of society was enhanced by the freer
access to foreign travel and the visits by West-
ern tourists.
The effects of tourism just described and
the general upsurge of the private sphere and
private ownership were concentrated in the
parts of the country already mentioned, where
the tourist industry was concentrated. This
meant that these processes contributed to in-
creasing regional development differences.
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2) CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY AND
REGIONAL PROCESSES
AFTER THE CHANGE OF SYSTEM
Before turning to some of the issues concern-
ing the situation and development of Hun-
gary’s regions, it is worth recalling the main
processes undergone by the economy of Hun-
gary and other CEE countries in the long dec-
ade of transformation. These are simply out-
lined here, without any pretensions to com-
pleteness.
2.1. The main processes in the economy
The GDP trends in the CEE countries after the
change of system were remarkably similar
(Figures 2 and 3). Society was first shaken by
a massive recession of almost 20 per cent in
the early 1990s (on a scale reminiscent of the
Great Depression of the 1930s). Then came
some years of usually slow, but accelerating
growth in the second half of the decade. By
the turn of the millennium, the economic out-
put of most CEE countries had regained and
slightly exceeded its size before the change of
system.11
Similar fluctuations on various scales
can be seen for other indices. Employment fell
back strongly (by 30 per cent in Hungary and
15–20 per cent in other CEE countries) and
then stabilized at a lower level (Figure 4). Real
wages declined sharply in the early years,
while consumption and investment fell back
by 15–25 per cent. The recovery brought the
consumption level back to its earlier level by
the end of the decade. The level of investment
                                                
11 Two comments need adding. (i) Poland’s position
compared with 1989 was better, but there had been a
protracted and deep recession there around 1980. If
this is adjusted for, the trough and recovery were simi-
lar to those in other ECE countries. (ii) The more east-
erly post-socialist countries suffered a deeper and
longer recession. Bulgaria’s was 33 per cent and bot-
tomed out only in 1997. In the three Baltic states, the
recession bottomed out at 49–36 per cent in 1994–5,
while in Russia the trough was 44 per cent in 1998, etc.
exceeded its pre-change of system level,
which had been depressed.
The biggest change in economic struc-
ture came in external economic relations,
where the previous dominance of trade and
cooperation with the Soviet Union and
COMECON countries shifted to the West, par-
ticularly EU countries and most of all Ger-
many. The dollar values of exports and im-
ports increased very rapidly, 4 to 4.5 times
over, in the decade of transformation (only
twice over in the case of Slovenia). An export
(and import) increment of this magnitude
means that export growth was the factor that
lifted the CEE countries out of their transfor-
mational recession, and exports have come to
represent a high proportion of economic out-
put. (For Hungary, the value of exports rose
from a third of GDP in 1989 to almost two-
thirds in 2001.)
A seminal role in expanding Western
relations was played by capital imports of for-
eign direct investment (FDI, Figures 5 and 6).
The multinational corporations importing the
capital have helped to couple these historically
close economies to developed Europe into the
world economy, by participating in privatiza-
tion, making greenfield investments and in-
troducing modern, marketable technologies
and products and up-to-date management
techniques. The CEE countries have relatively
skilled, cheap, employable labour, and robust
social structures and legal systems, which
have proved capable of receiving imported
capital in a way that satisfies its profit re-
quirements. The dominant relations have been
built up with EU countries. This means that
most of the CEE countries have become rela-
tively undeveloped parts of the European sys-
tem of economic integration before they ac-
cede to the EU. (See Figure 8 on the six CEE
candidate countries.)
Having outlined the economic transfor-
mation of the CEE countries in general terms,
it is worth noting three specific features of the
Hungarian economy:
1. One basic aspect of the transformation was
to remove the dominance of state owner-
ship in the economy, through privatization.
During the initial phase, Czechoslovakia
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primarily, but also Poland and other former
socialist countries, sought to turn state-
owned enterprises into firms owned by citi-
zens (either the public as a whole or just
the employees of the firms being privat-
ized).12 In Hungary, on the other hand, the
governments and parliaments of the transi-
tion period consistently used cash sales to
privatize through competitive bidding and
accepted sales to foreign investors. Citizens’
or employee ownership played only a mar-
ginal role. (By the end of the 1990s, sale
had become the prevalent method of priva-
tization in the other CEE countries as
well.13)
2. Compared with other countries, Hungary
found the influx of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) playing a conspicuously im-
portant role in its transformation and pri-
vatization between the change of system
and the end of 1997. It was the destination
for 46 per cent of the operating capital
(imported into the CEE countries) found
their place in Hungary. Thus the amount of
FDI per capita invested by the end of 1997
was $1548 in Hungary, $838 in the Czech
Republic, $221 in Poland and $192 in Slo-
                                                
12 Czechoslovakia, in the year after the change of re-
gime, sold big companies to the adult population at
nominal prices, for vouchers representing a specific
share of the company’s book value. (Everyone had a
right as a citizen to buy vouchers up to a specified
amount.) These vouchers, like shares, were floated on
the stock exchange and bought up by investment funds
launched by state-owned banks, and the funds soon
bought themselves into majority ownership positions in
each company. This method of privatization was then
adopted by some other post-socialist countries, which
failed to employ it with Czech precision. The drawbacks
appeared later. The scheme only appears to remove the
state as owner, since the majority of the vouchers are
owned by investment funds controlled by state-owned
banks. State influence and responsibility remain. Fur-
thermore, the method prevents the involvement of im-
ported capital, whereas it is essential to obtain expertise
and capital for modernization and entry into interna-
tional markets.
13 The preponderance of sales in Hungarian privatiza-
tion and the relegation of ‘popular’ or employees’ own-
ership came after experience in the mid-1980s, when
state-owned and municipally owned enterprises were
placed under the control of employees’ councils. The
irrational effects of this soon appeared as short-
termism, in which development criteria took second
place to the immediate earnings aspirations of employ-
ees and managers.
vakia. Meanwhile half the registered com-
panies in Hungary contained a foreign
stake of more than 10 per cent. On the
production and sales side, privatized com-
panies modernized through a foreign own-
ership stake and foreign-owned greenfield
investments became the bases for an offen-
sive that saw Hungary’s exports increase by
15–25 per cent a year for several years
running. (Capital investment began to rise
rapidly in the other CEE countries in 1998,
especially the Czech Republic and Poland,
which managed to catch up with Hungary
again.)
For a CEE country, the measures of
reform taken under the party-state left
Hungary well placed to receive capital im-
ports.14 On the other hand, Hungary at the
change of system had huge debts to private
banks abroad and in the form of state
bonds traded abroad. The one way to re-
duce these debts and the service costs of
them, which exceeded the capabilities of
the economy, was to attract foreign capital,
for instance for privatization purchases,
and use most of the proceeds for repay-
ments.15 So the country was saved from
spiralling indebtedness by a huge influx of
capital.
Privatization and high-technology
greenfield investments of imported capital
brought by the end of the 1990s a huge in-
crease in the export performance of Hun-
garian manufacturing and a radical change
in its structure. By that time, about 65 per
                                                
14 The reforms began in the 1960s and were halted in
the early 1970s, but the process picked up in the early
1980s, so that operation of the Hungarian economy
was already compatible with market forces on the eve
of the change of system. Among the specific steps taken
in the 1980s were measures to adapt capitalism, intro-
duction of a producer-price system that simulated
world-market prices, the introduction of personal in-
come tax and value-added tax, replacement of the mo-
nopoly bank with a two-tier banking system (a bank of
issue and commercial banks conducting commerical
transactions), company law codifying capitalist market
conditions, and legislation protecting foreign invest-
ments in Hungary.
15 Imported capital was very widely involved, for in-
stance, in privatization of the Hungarian infrastructure.
Right at the beginning of the transformation, the main
telephony companies were sold to foreign interests, as
were the energy companies in the mid-1990s.
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cent of manufacturing exports were gener-
ated by the ‘multis’ and two-thirds of
manufacturing exports were destined EU
countries. Figure 7 shows that there was an
epoch-making change, even by comparison
with other countries. The 10 per cent of
manufacturing exports produced by high-
tech industries in 1990 had become 34.5
per cent by 1998 – a higher proportion
than in the Netherlands!
There has probably been another al-
teration in the export structure of manu-
facturing in the last two years, although
precise figures are not yet available. The
causes have been a substantial drop in eco-
nomic growth, foreign capital imports and
productive investments in general, scars of
the worldwide recession, and withdrawal
or realignment by some foreign-owned
companies.16
3. It has been implied that Hungary enjoyed
some advantage over the other CEE coun-
tries in the first long decade of the trans-
formation. This advantage was com-
pounded by the effects of the stabilization
and consolidation measures taken in 1995
(the Bokros Package). The price was an 11
per cent drop in real wages and falls of 10
per cent each in personal consumption and
budgetary redistribution. But the relative
stability of the economy was restored. The
country’s competitiveness improved, and
helped by a recovery in the world econ-
omy, a high sustainable growth rate (4–6
per cent a year) was attained, along with a
massive rate of increase in exports (15–25
per cent a year). Apart from the thorough
reorganization and modernization of the
economic structure, the inward flow of
capital stabilized at around $2 billion a
year (even without major acts of privatiza-
tion). The 1995–2000 period was indeed a
period of promising economic develop-
ment.
The chronicle of the early years of the
21st century has to include a reference to the
political sphere. As the 2002 elections ap-
                                                
16 It seems certain that one cause of withdrawal by for-
eign interests was a jump in Hungarian wage levels in
1999–2002.
proached, ever more bitter political antago-
nism developed between the opposition so-
cialist-liberal coalition, which had carried out
the tough economic measures when in gov-
ernment, and the conservative-national gov-
ernment headed by Fidesz. As a result, several
irrational, populist measures were taken at the
expense of the budget,17 as the two sides tried
to outbid each other in expensive election
promises.18 The political developments even-
tually placed the economy in a difficult posi-
tion, at a time when the world economy was
slowing. It now suffers from significant budg-
etary and balance-of-payments deficits and its
competitiveness compared with the other CEE
countries has greatly deteriorated.
2.2. The regional consequences and
effects of  the change of system
The change of system brought transformations
and reorganizations that produced a number
of new regional processes and phenomena.
This section picks out some issues as a way of
showing aspects of the consequences for re-
gional processes. Mention is made of the
causes behind them, along with territorial
differences and their order of magnitude, ar-
eas that won and lost by the transformation,
and the characteristics of the changes that
have ensued.
2.2.1. Causes and effects
The state-socialist economy declined almost
overnight as a result of the change of system.
Hitherto ‘developed industrial areas’ found
themselves suffering grave economic and em-
ployment crises. Many state-owned enter-
                                                
17 For instance, the minimum wage was almost doubled
by increases in consecutive years, economically irra-
tional terms given for student credits, and highly subsi-
dized housing construction and purchase loan schemes
introduced.
18 The 50 per cent pay rise in the public sector prom-
ised and implemented in 2002 may have been justified
in social and pay-relativity terms, but not in terms of
the funds available for it.
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prises and other business organizations still
competitive on Western markets despite out-
moded equipment and technologies faced im-
mediate insolvency. Others converted into
companies and/or were privatized, in some
cases becoming wholly foreign-owned. Most
of the peasant-owned agricultural land under
state socialism had been farmed collectively by
cooperatives. It became possible during the
transformation to withdraw such land (or
land received under compensation schemes)
from the cooperatives. Mainly for political
reasons, assets of large-scale agricultural con-
cerns and cooperatives were paid out as com-
pensation, divided up or scattered, so that
most of them ceased operating. As a result,
more than half the country’s farmland came
to be divided into holdings too small for mod-
ern farming methods to be employed.
The regional consequence was the
emergence of crisis regions, with a surge of
unemployment and impoverishment that will
be referred to later. The response in many
cases was to distribute handouts rather than
devise and implement development pro-
grammes. The resulting territorial inequalities
have become apparent in living conditions,
including infrastructural provisions and
availability of public services. Naturally, pri-
vatization and the subsequent extension of the
private sector and arrival of foreign invest-
ment were concentrated in territories (coun-
ties, regions, towns, etc.) where the conditions
of operation were the most favourable. It will
be seen that this means mainly Budapest, the
national capital, and the Budapest-Vienna
axis, which covers almost the whole of West-
ern Hungary, as well as one or two other cities
(Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen, etc.) The north and
east of the country and the Great Hungarian
Plain, already less developed parts of the
country for historical reasons, have become
peripheral in many respects.
This obviously means that ‘the territorial
differentiating element is the ability to with-
stand the crisis and adapt to market-economic
conditions. A big role is played in this by the
geographical location of the region concerned,
its inherited economic structure, its social
preparedness, its level of educational attain-
ment, its ability to innovate, and its bourgeois
traditions.’19
2.2.2. GDP per capita in the counties
and regions20
The county and regional development shown
in terms of GDP per capita in Figure 11 as
proportions of the national average in the last
half-decade21 reveal some important points:
* The development level of Budapest is al-
most twice the national average.
* County development has been exception-
ally strong in Pest County, which surrounds
Budapest.
* The four Transdanubian counties have in-
creased noticeably by comparison with the
national average.
* The relative development level of 14 coun-
ties has decreased to varying extents over
the half-decade analysed. This is also ex-
pressed in the fact that the three regions in
the west of the country attained a relative
increase in their level of development,22
while the other four regions declined.
Figure 12 shows the regional GDP dis-
tribution in 1996 and 2000. The proportions
of Central Hungary (which comes top with
proportions of 41.6 and 43.1 per cent), Cen-
tral Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia
(making 61 per cent in 1996 and 65.4 per
cent in 2000 between them) increased, while
those of the other regions declined from 38.1
per cent in 1996 to 34.6 per cent in 2000.
Figure 13 shows the per capita GDP fig-
ures for counties and regions as proportions of
the EU–15 average. The GDP per capita pro-
                                                
19 Enyedi (1996), pp. 20–21.
20 County and regional boundaries are shown in Fig-
ures 9 and 10 respectively.
21 Territorial (county and regional) figures for GDP
were only introduced in the mid-1990s, so that earlier
data are not available..
22 In the Central Transdanubia region, the relative level
of development in Komárom-Esztergom County de-
clined slightly, as did that of Zala County in Western
Transdanubia, while all the other counties in the two
regions improved.
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portions of all counties in Hungary (except
Budapest) and therefore all regions lay below
the critical 75 per cent mark. The three coun-
ties of Gy r-Moson-Sopron, Fejér and Vas
have proportions of 69, 65 and 59 per cent,
which means they will qualify for EU support
for a few more years. All the other counties
(and regions) show underdevelopment that
will qualify them for EU co-financing of proj-
ects for a longer period.
The EU gives partial project funding
only if the GDP per capita of the applicant re-
gion is below 75 per cent of the average GDP
per capita for EU member-states and the gov-
ernment (and/or regional government) guar-
antees to match the funding.
2.2.3. Territorial magnitudes of foreign
investments and capital imports
It has been seen in Figure 6 that a noticeable
change in the magnitude of the foreign capital
arriving in Hungary occurred in 2001 and
still more 2002. (The causes of this have been
discussed already.) In 2001, $1.9 billion
flowed into Hungary, but only $800 million
did so in 2002. However, it is worth noting
that as a result of the world recession and
current investment uncertainties and en-
hanced risks, the proportion of FDI halved in
2000 in the world and fell by 39–41 per cent
in Western Europe and the EU countries.23
Figure 14 shows county and regional
figures for the subscribed foreign capital per
capita, while Figure 15 presents the distribu-
tion of foreign investments by destination. The
figures show that the regional placement of
foreign capital (which has been unchanged
for several years) is focused on Budapest. Bu-
dapest and Western Hungary have received
84 per cent of the investments, while the
Great Plain and Northern Hungary have re-
ceived only 16 per cent.
Figure 17 presents a cross-section of
firms with a foreign stake in 1998 and the re-
                                                
23 Source: World Investment Report 2002 Transnational
Corporations and Export Competitiveness. New
York/Geneva: United Nations, 2002. Annex B. p. 303.
gional distribution of these. Central Hungary,
Central Transdanubia and Western Transda-
nubia between them contain 76 per cent of
the firms with a foreign stake, while Northern
Hungary contains only 3.2 per cent of them.
Interestingly, the distribution of investments
per annum is more even: 39 per cent to the
most developed region, another 31 per cent to
the three Transdanubian regions and 30 per
cent to the three less developed regions. The
conclusion must simply be that the expansion
of foreign capital does nothing to even the
standards of the regions. On the contrary, it
serves to reproduce the backwardness of the
less developed regions.
Figure 16 shows the structure of im-
ported capital by country of origin: 75 per
cent of the foreign capital invested in Hungary
comes from EU countries (including 28 per
cent from Germany, 22 per cent from the
Netherlands and 12 per cent from Austria), 2
per cent each from Switzerland and Japan,
and 12 per cent from other countries.
2.2.4. Employment, activity rates and
the qualifications of the active
workforce
The deep economic recession that occurred in
the early years of the transformation has been
presented already (Figure 4). As a result, 30
per cent of the Hungarian workforce, most of
them unskilled or low-skilled, left the labour
market. After activity rates of 51 per cent in
1980 and 45 per cent in 1990, the rate was
down to 37 per cent in 2001.
What has happened to county and re-
gional employment in the last two decades?
The data on the activity rate24 in Figure
18 shows the following:
* Activity rates in the seven regions in 1980
were in the 46–50 per cent range. They
                                                
24 Unemployment figures are notoriously uncertain.
(For instance, those no longer qualifying for unem-
ployment benefit may still be unemployed but no longer
registered as such.) The activity rate represents labour
relations more realistically, from the employment side.
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were somewhat down to the 42–45 per
cent range by 1990.
* Twelve years later, in 2001, the rates in the
three developed regions (Central Hungary,
Central Transdanubia and Western Trans-
danubia) had hardly changed (40–41 per
cent), while those of the four less-
developed regions had sunk dramatically
from 43–45 per cent to 30–34 per cent.
The lowest proportion of all was 29.9 per
cent in the least developed region of North-
ern Great Plain. The regional educational-
attainment structure of the employed al-
tered in every region (to varying extents)
and in Hungary as a whole over the two-
decade period (Figure 19). In Hungary as a
whole (Figure 19), the proportion of those
with a low educational attainment was 54
per cent in 1980, 39 per cent in 1990, and
only 20 per cent in 2001. Those with a
high educational attainment (tertiary or
university qualifications) was 8 per cent in
1980, 12 per cent in 1990 and 18 per cent
in 2001.
* The proportion of those with low educa-
tional attainment decreased and the pro-
portion of those with high educational at-
tainment increased over the two decades in
every big city, county and region in the
country.
* In 1980, the proportion with low educa-
tional attainment in the three economically
developed regions was in the 46–54 per
cent range. This had fallen to 17–21 per
cent by 2001, while the proportion of those
with high educational attainment had risen
from 6–12 per cent in 1980 to 14–25 per
cent in 2001. The highest rate of 25 per
cent was found in Central Hungary.
* In the four less-developed regions, those
with low educational attainment made up
proportions of 57–60 per cent in 1980,
39–43 per cent in 1990 and 21–23 per
cent in 2001. Those with high educational
attainment, at 15–16 per cent, were ap-
proaching the proportion in the Central
and Western Transdanubia regions.
Turning to the structure of educational
attainment in the workforce of Budapest and
the eight other larger cities in Hungary,25 Bu-
dapest heads the list with 30 per cent having
high educational attainment. The eight other
cities had comparable proportions of 22–27
per cent in 2001. The reason is clearly that
many people these days need a high educa-
tional attainment to find a job.
The change in the educational-
attainment structure of the least developed
county in Hungary, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg,
is instructive. In 1980, the proportion with a
low educational attainment was 60 per cent in
1980, 42 per cent in 1990 and only 21 per
cent in 2001. The proportion with a high edu-
cational attainment rose from 6 per cent in
1980 and 9 per cent in 1990 to 16 per cent in
2001.
In the less developed regions, there is a
high proportion among those with high edu-
cational attainment who have a tertiary quali-
fication (three-year diploma), while in the
more developed region the dominant grade is
a university qualification (five-year degree).
The branch structure of employment in
the country as a whole underwent a funda-
mental change. In 1980, 29.4 per cent of the
employed were working in manufacturing, as
opposed to 26.4 per cent in 1990 and 24.3
per cent 2001. The proportion working in the
tertiary sector, on the other hand, went from
39.1 per cent in 1980 to 46.7 per cent in
1990 (after the creation of several new mar-
ket-related organizations, banks and institu-
tions) and 61.6 per cent in 2001. The trans-
formation of manufacturing described earlier
and the activities concerned with introducing
markets result almost invariably in a demand
for higher employee qualifications, which ac-
counts for the increase in the proportion of
the active with higher educational attain-
ments.
                                                
25 Debrecen, Gy r, Kecskemét, Miskolc, Nyíregyháza,
Pécs, Szeged and Székesfehérvár all have at least
100,000 inhabitants.
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2.2.5. Winners and losers by the
change of system
Stronger market forces and economic compe-
tition after the change of system strengthened
the processes differentiating and selecting
within the economy and the regulation sup-
porting those processes. The post-
transformation recession affected different
parts of the country to different extents. Dis-
tricts dominated by weak territorial structures
and crisis industries became the losers by the
change of system and the regions with diver-
sified structures the winners (see Figure 20).
The change of system heightened the
differences between centre and periphery. The
differences in economic potential between
Budapest and the provinces have grown.
Building up the market economy has benefited
developed areas, especially Budapest, more
than backward areas. The spatial differences
in production are far exceeded by the differ-
ences between Budapest and the provinces in
income and capital accumulation.26
Subsections II.2.2, II.2.3 and II.2.4, in
discussing the index of GDP per capita, the
placement of foreign capital and regional dif-
ferences in employment, have already men-
tioned the development differences between
counties and regions – Budapest and Pest
County, along with Western and Northern
Transdanubia, have been the winners by the
transformation. The losers have mainly been
the North Hungary and Northern Great Plain
regions. Those who have sunk in these loser
regions are mainly the poorly educated and
unskilled, so that poverty has increased during
the transformation.
To show the magnitude and localities of
poverty more specifically, let us use the sim-
plest yardstick: the proportion of the popula-
tion in the lowest income decile. As an auxil-
iary index to show degree of inequality, let us
take the ratio of the highest and lowest income
deciles. These measures are shown for three
years in Figure 21.
                                                
26 See Horváth (2002), pp. 400–404.
The figures plainly show a significant,
30 per cent increase in the national propor-
tion of poverty (membership of the lowest in-
come decile) and an increase in income differ-
entiation.
Out of the proportion belonging to the
lowest income decile was derived so-called
risk indices reflecting settlement and regional
dispersion of poverty (Figure 22).27 These data
show clearly that poverty is concentrated in
the North Hungarian and Northern Great
Plain regions on the one hand and in villages
on the other. Budapest is again in the best
situation.
3) TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
REGION-BUILDING
In the words of a Hungarian authority on the
subject, ‘The local-government-area structure
of the Hungarian economy does not currently
meet the competitiveness requirements of the
post-industrial age and European integration.
The decentralizing notions of the 20th century
have failed. The barriers to progress in every
decentralizing period have been erected ob-
jectively by wide development differences in
the country and subjectively by a combination
of resistance by central power…and histori-
cally determined provincial behaviour in the
country’s system of district administration. In
vain did documents from the end of the 1920s
to the present day emphasize the importance
of the region-forming functions of big urban
centres. Political elites with short-term inter-
ests obstructed in every age any move to de-
velop outside the capital the critical mass to
exert the strength to impose a decentralization
of power, given a favourable conjunction of
                                                
27 The risk is represented here by a fraction. The nu-
merator is the proportion of the population in the set-
tlement or region in the lowest income decile and the
denominator the proportion of that population to the
national population. The risk is 1 if the two proportions
are the same. The higher the value above 1, the deeper
the poverty.
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circumstances’28 (which never arose, in this
author’s opinion.)
The practice of regional development in
Europe up to now has shown that a subna-
tional level operating on a self-governing
principle and containing a population of 1.5–
2.0 million provides the optimum framework
for development, assertion of interests, and
creation of today’s infrastructure of regional
policy and an apparatus of professional or-
ganization, planning and execution. Such
units are also a decisive element in the EU
system of regional and cohesive political deci-
sion-making.29
The Hungarian author goes on to say
that one of the most important arguments for
regionalization in Hungary today is its en-
couragement of spatial distribution of innova-
tive, market-compatible activity and provision
of long-term infrastructural and organiza-
tional conditions for it. ‘The other factor of an
economic nature is the country’s external
economic orientation. This country is doing
two-thirds of its foreign-trade goods turnover
with countries whose federalized or regional-
ized systems of state give their regional gov-
ernment units considerable powers. It is not
immaterial, therefore, with what scale and
competence of regional units this country ap-
pears on these markets and what it can offer
investors. A region with a population of 1.5
million and differentiated infrastructural and
production characteristics is more attractive to
investors than the present units of regional
government [counties] would be.’ The third
argument, to do with modernizing the system
of state administration, also supposes mod-
ernization of the ‘deconcentrated system of
organizations’.30
With Hungary’s accession to the EU im-
minent (and with its present associate status),
there are two focuses for reorganizing the
system of public administration that operates
at present.
                                                
28 Horváth (2000), pp. 456–8.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
1. The Hungarian counties (dating back a
thousand years, as mentioned already) are
too small to exercise every potential inte-
gration function and force. They are also
too small to meet EU size criteria for sub-
national units. Their size would be an ob-
stacle to them being treated as single units
within the EU administration. Hungarian
counties have an average population of
500,000 and area of 5000 sq. km, as
against average sizes for EU regions that far
exceed these figures (see Figure 23).
The EU has developed a hierarchical
system of territorial statistics to go with the
so-called NUTS system (Nomenclature des
Unités Territoriales Statistiques). This oper-
ates on five planes, of which the top (first)
plane is either the whole country or major
regions within it, according to how the
country concerned decides.
During the negotiations with the EU,
it was decided that as dimensions of Hun-
gary’s counties do not accord with NUTS 2,
the most important plane, units of that size
should be created, and the counties can
then fit in perfectly at NUTS 3 level. 31
2. The developmental autonomy of counties in
Hungary and financial opportunities open
to them are extremely limited. The major
decisions about county developments are
taken nationally (albeit at the instigation of
the country) and largely financed out of the
central budget. The county authority’s own
revenues are insufficient to perform the
county’s immediate tasks, let alone to fi-
nance developments. Statutory tasks are fi-
nanced by transfers from the central
budget calculated according to normative
costs.32
The solution is seemingly simple.
1. A system of local government has to be cre-
ated by merging counties, three to a region.
(Proto-regions already exist in terms of EU
                                                
31 See Kovács (1999).
32 For instance, there is a normative cost calculation in
forints per annum of maintaining one place at a school,
while the normative sum for hospital maintenance is
calculated from the county population.
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administration, but otherwise only in a
formal sense.)
2. A much higher proportion of the budgetary
revenues deriving from counties (regions)
has to be turned into county (regional)
revenues, to provide the vitally important
financial basis for self-government.
However, these ostensibly simple solu-
tions are by no means simply to apply.
Taking the second point first, such fi-
nancial independence based on revenue from
each region’s territory under a requisite sys-
tem of more or less uniform, decentralized
financial sources (tax and other revenues and
scale of these) presumes that the units will be
roughly equal in development level and ca-
pacity to generate revenues. It has already
been shown in several dimensions that the
opposite is the case in Hungary. If the finan-
cial independence of the counties (regions)
rested on more or less uniform revenue regu-
lations, the sizeable historical differences be-
tween comparatively rich Budapest and the
counties of Northern Transdanubia on the one
hand and the poorer counties of North Hun-
gary and the Northern Great Plain would in-
crease, not diminish. Sooner or later, some-
thing would have to be done. So the central-
ism of development and other decisions of a
structural character, along with the financial
system behind it, cannot be abandoned.
Roughly speaking, the state revenues will have
to be centralized and redistributed to finance
county (regional) tasks, using various well-
chosen methods of earmarking funds, by de-
vising and applying rules agreed among all
those concerned. Of course, the taxation and
the earmarking mechanism may be well or ill-
chosen, but centralism can only give way to
decentralization slowly and steadily as the
chances arise over many years.
Turning to the first point, there is a his-
torically evolved apparatus for performing the
functions of today’s counties and county seats,
with concomitant customary laws and infra-
structural provisions. None of these are yet
possessed by the recently devised regions,
which simply meet EU requirements in a for-
mal sense. People’s loyalties remain, for in-
stance, to Zala County, not to South-West
Transdanubia. Each region combines three
counties. What government is going to accept
political responsibility for choosing one of the
three historic county seats as the regional seat
in a position of national sub-centre and for
demoting the other two cities?
These questions have to be thought
through, and then it becomes clear why four
governments since the change of system have
done only the minimum to comply with the
demands of the EU bureaucracy in creating
and operating Hungary’s regions. With less
than a year to go before Hungary and other
CEE countries gain full EU membership, the
present government and Parliament have
hardly gone beyond hesitation. No real pro-
gramme of action or EU-compatible reform of
public administration has been devised. The
authors see the following strategy for struc-
tural change as probable in the next five or
ten years.
The county system will remain as the
operative sub-national system on a concrete
level. Lightly staffed, three-county regions will
emerge with three main functions:
1. They will perform integration and organ-
izational tasks within the region and with
other regions (even regions in other coun-
tries).
2. They will act as organizers of the division
of labour among their constituent counties
(in ways regulated perhaps by statute).
Furthermore, they will represent and lobby
for regional interests in the outside world.
3. On a county level, they will prepare and
draw up the region’s projects, and repre-
sent them to the government and the EU
apparatus during the bargaining process.
These functions are timely and impor-
tant to the development of the whole country.
The Hungarian Parliament, government and
political elite will commit a great mistake if it
does not put these tasks on the agenda, and
after successfully promoting them (probably
after some hard debates), does not organize
coordinated preparatory work by experienced
staff with specialist administrative, sociologi-
cal and economic expertise.
* * * * *
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Figure 1
Map showing the territory of Hungary before 1920, after the Treaty of Trianon,
during the Second World War, and today
Figure 2
Real GDP/NMP in selected transforming countries, 1980 and 1987–2000
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Source: Economic Survey of Europe (hereafter ESE) 2001, No. 2. New York/Geneva: UN, pp. 162–4.
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Figure 3
Real GDP/NMP in three European regions,
1980 and 1989–2000, 1989 = 100
Country 1980 1989 = 100 Trough 2000
Central Europe
Czech Republic 93.71 100 1992–1993 86.9 98.7
Hungary 86.3 100 1993 81.9 104.2
Poland 91.1 100 1991 82.2 126.7
Slovakia 97.11 100 1993 75.1 102.8
Slovenia 98.9 100 1992 79.1 110.4
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 76.2 100 1997 66.6 74.7
Croatia 99.0 100 1993 59.5 80.7
Romania 88.5 100 1992 75.0 78.3
Yugoslavia 95.72 100 1993 40.6 45.4
Baltic States (Σ) 67.8 100 1994 55.2 69.1
Estonia 74.5 100 1994 63.7 85.3
Latvia 68.5 100 1995 51.0 64.1
Lithuania 64.7 100 1994 54.3 66.1
CIS (Σ)1 77.5 100 1996 55.0 60.8
Georgia 79.4 100 1994 23.4 31.8
Russian Federation 78.1 100 1998 55.8 63.7
Tajikistan 80.8 100 1996 29.8 35.9
Ukraine 75.0 100 1999 39.3 41.6
Uzbekistan 76.0 100 1995 80.5 97.6
Note: 1 Net material product for 1980-1990
Source: ESE, No.2, 2001, p. 162.
Figure 4
Employment in CEE countries, 1989–2000
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Total employment
1989
1993
1997
1998
1999
2000
2000–1989, ’000s
2000–1989, %
5405
4848
4947
4869
4693
4587
-818
-15.1
5490
3827
3646
3698
3811
3849
-1641
-29.9
16994
14330
15410
15800
15373
15294
-1700
-10.0
2380
2012
2206
2199
2132
2102
-278
-11.7
Rate of employment1
1989
1993
2000
52.2
46.9
44.5
52.3
37.2
38.1
44.9
37.3
39.5
44.9
37.8
38.9
Notes: 1 Total employment/population (%).
Sources: WIIW Handbook of Statistics: Countries in Transition 2001. Vienna: WIIW, pp. 8–32.
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Figure 5
FDI inflow into CEE countries, 1992–2000, USD millions
Period Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
1992 1003 1474 678 100
1993 568 2339 1715 168
1994 869 1146 1874 250
1995 2562 4456 3659 202
1996 1428 2275 4498 330
1997 1300 2173 4908 220
1998 3718 2036 6365 684
1999 6326 1970 7270 365
2000 4595 1700 9000 2075
Source: WIIW Handbook of Statistics, 1997. Vienna: WIIW, p. 395; ibid. 2001, p. 449. Compiled by the Wie-
ner Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche with support from Bank of Austria.
Figure 6
FDI in Eastern Europe, 2001–2002
Inflows (million dollars) Inflows/GDP (per cent)
January-September January-September
2001 2001 2002 2001 2001 2002
Eastern Europe 21784 14201 18494 4.8 4.3 5.1
Albania 207 156 95 5.0 5.0 2.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina 130 98 180 2.8 2.8 4.8
Bulgaria 694 494 289 5.1 5.0 2.6
Croatia 1512 868 653 7.7 5.9 4.0
Czech Republic 4916 3186 7068 8.7 7.7 14.1
Estonia 542 408 223 9.8 9.9 4.7
Hungary* 2443 1877 834 4.7 5.0 1.8
Latvia 154 246 349 2.0 4.5 5.8
Lithuania 446 346 577 3.7 3.9 5.8
Poland (cash basis) 6995 4149 2612 3.8 3.1 1.9
Romania 1157 743 741 2.9 2.7 2.4
Slovakia 1475 859 3391 7.2 5.6 19.8
Slovenia 503 289 1105 2.7 2.1 7.1
Note: * Excludes reinvested profits
Source: ESE No. 1, 2003. New York/Geneva: UN, p. 93.
Figure 7
Structure of CEE manufacturing exports to the EU, 1990 and 1998
High1 Medium2 Low3
technology
1990 1998 1990 1998 1990 1998
Manufacturing
Hungary 9.7 34.5 23.5 37.1 66.8 28.3 100
Poland 6.2 13.6 27.5 30.5 66.3 55.9 100
Netherlands 17.3 31.4 34.8 31.2 47.8 37.4 100
Spain 11.2 13.5 50.8 54.4 37.9 32.1 100
Notes: 1 2423: Pharmaceuticals, 30: Office machinery, 32: Radio, TV sets, 31: Electrical machinery and app.,
353: Aircraft, spacecraft, 33: Medical, precision, optical instruments. 2 241: Organic, inorganic basic chemi-
cals, 251: Manufacture of rubber products, 252: Manufacture of plastic products, 272–74: Non-ferrous met-
als, aluminium, 29: Machinery and equipment, 352: Railway and tramway locomotives, 34: Motor vehicles,
trailers, 354: Manufacture of bicycles and motorcycles, 355: Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c., 36,
37: Other manufacturing industries, 242–2423: Chemical products except pharmaceuticals. 3 15, 16: Food,
beverages, tobacco, 17–19: Textile, clothing leather, 20: Wood and wood products, 21–22: Paper and print-
ing, 232: Manufacture of refined petroleum, 231: Coal and petroleum products, 26: Other non-metallic min-
erals, 271: Manufacture of basic metals, 28: Fabricated metals, 351: Building and repairing of boats.
Source: Éltet , Andrea: ‘The Effect of FDI on the Technology Structure in Internaional Comparison’. In: FDI
and Technology Development on the Eve of the 21st Century, Budapest: OM, 2000, pp. 138–73.
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Figuere 8
GNI per capita in the EU countries, the transition countries,
the United States and Japan, 2001
GNI/capita
Purchasing power
parity in USD EU15 = 100 EU21 = 100
Inhabitants
(millions)
Austria 27080 111 121 8.11
Belgium 28210 116 126 10.25
Denmark 27950 115 125 5.34
Finland 25180 103 113 5.18
France 25280 104 113 58.89
Netherlands 26440 109 119 15.92
Ireland 27460 113 123 3.79
Luxembourg 48080 198 216 0.44
United Kingdom 24460 100 110 59.74
Germany 25530 105 114 82.15
Italy 24340 100 109 57.69
Sweden 24670 101 111 8.87
EU12 25302 104 113 316.37
Greece 17860 73 80 10.56
Portugal 17270 71 77 10.01
Spain 20150 83 90 39.47
EU+3 19267 79 86 60.04
EU15 24340 100 109 376.41
Czech Republic 14550 60 65 10.27
Estonia 10020 41 45 1.37
Poland 9280 38 42 38.65
Hungary 12570 52 56 10.02
Slovenia 18160 75 81 1.99
Slovakia 11610 48 52 5.4
Candidates 6 11028 45 49 67.7
Bulgaria 5950 24 27 8.17
Latvia 7870 32 35 2.37
Lithuania 7610 31 34 3.69
Romania 6980 29 31 22.44
Transition countries 4 6871 28 31 36.67
EU15 + 6 22310 92 100 444.11
United States 34870 143 156 281.55
Japan 27430 113 123 126.87
Notes: Gross (or net) national income (at market prices) represents total primary income receivable by resident
institutional units: compensation of employees, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, property in-
come (receivable less payable), (gross or net) operating surplus and (gross or net) mixed income. Gross na-
tional income (at market prices) equals GDP minus primary income payable by resident units to non-resident
units, plus primary income receivable by resident units from the rest of the world.
Source: World Bank, www.worldbank.org.
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Figure 9
Hungary’s counties
Figure 10
Regions in Hungary
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Figure 11
GDP per capita as a proportion of the national average,
%, 1996 and 2000
GDP/capita
% of national average Ranking of county/regionCapital, county, region
1996 2000 1996 2000
Budapest 185.4 195.2 1 1
Pest 73.0 78.1 17 10
Central Hungary 146.9 152.3 I I
Fejér 103.3 126.8 4 3
Komárom-Esztergom 89.4 83.3 8 7
Veszprém 80.9 84.8 9 6
Central Transdanubia 91.8 100.5 III III
Gy r-Moson-Sopron 110.5 133.7 2 2
Vas 109.4 114.2 3 4
Zala 93.3 84.9 5 5
Western Transdanubia 105.0 113.9 II II
Baranya 77.7 75.7 11 11
Somogy 74.8 68.0 15 14
Tolna 90.7 82.6 7 9
Southern Transdanubia 80.0 74.8 V IV
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 70.6 65.0 18 18
Heves 73.7 70.5 16 13
Nógrád 57.1 54.5 20 19
North Hungary 69.1 64.6 VII VI
Hajdú-Bihar 78.1 70.8 10 12
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 75.5 66.6 14 16
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 59.2 54.1 19 20
Northern Great Plain 70.4 63.4 VI VII
Bács-Kiskun 75.7 67.6 13 15
Békés 76.4 65.9 12 17
Csongrád 92.8 82.9 6 8
Southern Great Plain 81.2 71.9 IV V
Source: A regionális fejl dés Magyarországon. (The regional development in Hungary.) Mikroszkóp. Az
ECOSTAT – Economy- analytical and Informatics Institute' publication. p. 2., 27.02.2003. Special-number.
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Figure 12
Breakdown of GDP by region
1996
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Source: A regionális elemzések módszertani kérdései. Esettanulmány:
Magyarország kistérségi fejlettségének elemzése. ECOSTAT. May, 2003.
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Figure 13
GDP per capita as a proportion of the EU 15
average, 1996 and 2000, purchasing power
parity
GDP/capita calculated
in PPP
1996 2000
Budapest 86.4 100.1
Pest 34.0 40.1
Central Hungary 68.4 78.1
Fejér 48.2 65.0
Komárom-Esztergom 41.7 42.7
Veszprém 37.7 43.4
Central Transdanubia 42.8 51.5
Győr-Moson-Sopron 51.5 68.5
Vas 51.0 58.6
Zala 43.5 43.5
Western Transdanubia 48.9 58.4
Baranya 36.2 38.8
Somogy 34.9 34.9
Tolna 42.2 42.4
Southern Transdanubia 37.3 38.4
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 32.9 33.3
Heves 34.4 36.2
Nógrád 26.6 27.9
North Hungary 32.2 33.1
Hajdú-Bihar 36.4 36.3
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 35.2 34.2
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 27.6 27.8
Northern Great Plain 32.8 32.5
Bács-Kiskun 35.3 34.7
Békés 35.6 33.8
Csongrád 43.2 42.5
Southern Great Plain 37.9 36.8
Total 46.6 51.3
Source: A regionális fejlődés Magyarországon (ré-
giók, megyék, kistérségek) p. 3. ECOSTAT, 27. 02.
2003. Special-number
Figure 14
Foreign registered capital per head of popula-
tion in the counties and regions of Hungary,
1993 and 2000
Foreign registered capi-
tal per capita, HUF ’000County, region
1993 2000
Budapest 300.8 1106.3
Pest 71.5 395.6
Central Hungary 226.07 837.22
Fejér 83.1 265.4
Komárom-Esztergom 107.8 327.6
Veszprém 31.9 87.3
Middle Transdanubia 72.72 223.30
Győr-Moson-Sopron 82.7 382.3
Vas 59.4 296.3
Zala 45.9 97.7
Western Transdanubia 65.29 274.05
Baranya 45.5 77.6
Somogy 27.1 65.2
Tolna 20.4 37.3
Southern Transdanubia 33.05 63.24
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 25.1 185.5
Heves 35.9 186.2
Nógrád 36.7 79.0
North Hungary 29.83 167.56
Hajdú-Bihar 29.2 117.7
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 22.2 88.7
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 15.6 36.8
Northern Great Plain 22.29 79.38
Bács-Kiskun 28.1 69.4
Békés 29.7 83.0
Csongrád 22.2 183.6
Southern Great Plain 26.70 108.98
Source: Own calculations based on own database.
Calculated by the Central Statistical Office, Buda-
pest.
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Figure 15
Foreign capital by placement location, 1999
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Source: Meskó (2000), p. 21.
Figure 16
Foreign investment by country of origin, 1999
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Source: Meskó, p. 29.
Figure 17
Regional structure of companies with a foreign stake and investments, %, 1998
Central
Hungary
Central
Transdanubia
Western
Transdanubia
Southern
Transdanubia
North
Hungary
Northern
Great Plain
Southern
Great Plain
Companies 58.2 6.8 11.0 6.8 3.2 5.2 8.8
Investments 39.4 12.8 11.2 6.8 9.5 11.4 8.7
Source: Régiók Magyarországa (2002). Tér, Település, Régió. Magyar Tudománytár 2. kötet (Space, settlement,
region. Hungarian Scientific Library Vol. 2). Budapest: MTA Társadalomkutató Központ/ Kossuth Kiadó.
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Figure 18
Structure of employment by some sectors and qualifications in Hungary, 1980, 1990 and 2001
1980 1990 2001
Low High Low High Low HighNo. of em-
ployed educational attainment (%)
No. of em-
ployed educational attainment (%)
No. of em-
ployed educational attainment (%)
Central Hungary
Production 773 483 54 7 571 959 42 10 310 144 23 14
of which: Manufacturing 489 202 53 8 342 595 42 11 199 671 23 15
 Tertiary 726 559 38 18 773 160 28 23 852 498 15 29
Total 1 500 042 46 12 1 345 119 34 17 1 162 642 17 25
Employed/population  (%) 49.5 45.3 41.1
Central Transdanubia
Production 359 367 59 4 298 048 45 6 217 002 29 7
of which: Manufacturing 164 918 56 4 145 925 45 6 147 735 30 7
 Tertiary 181 328 45 11 204 010 31 17 229 813 18 21
Total 540 695 54 6 502 058 39 10 446 815 23 14
Employed/population  (%) 47.8 45.0 39.8
Western Transdanubia
Production 306 181 61 3 250 529 45 5 193 425 27 7
of which: Manufacturing 153 769 56 3 130 047 43 5 135 807 28 6
 Tertiary 181 196 42 13 200 920 29 17 221 938 16 22
Total 487 377 54 7 451 449 38 11 415 363 21 15
Employed/population  (%) 47.8 44.7 41.4
Southern Transdanubia
Production 313 036 64 3 243 484 48 5 137 898 30 7
of which: Manufacturing 113 097 60 2 92 939 47 4 78 375 31 5
 Tertiary 185 388 46 12 193 841 32 17 198 898 17 22
Total 498 424 57 6 437 325 41 10 336 796 22 16
Employed/population  (%) 47.0 43.0 33.9
North Hungary
Production 419 235 62 3 326 658 46 5 162 560 25 7
of which: Manufacturing 206 144 58 3 168 652 44 5 104 693 25 7
 Tertiary 222 967 45 12 230 943 30 17 229 460 14 22
Total 642 202 56 6 557 601 39 10 392 020 19 16
Employed/population  (%) 45.9 42.1 30.2
Northern Great Plain
Production 453 366 66 3 359 548 49 5 187 022 29 7
of which: Manufacturing 180 622 58 3 162 403 45 4 115 878 28 6
 Tertiary 257 067 47 12 269 431 33 17 278 736 17 22
Total 710 433 59 6 628 979 42 10 465 758 22 16
Employed/population  (%) 44.6 40.6 29.9
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1980 1990 2001
Low High Low High Low HighNo. of em-
ployed educational attainment (%)
No. of em-
ployed educational attainment (%)
No. of em-
ployed educational attainment (%)
Southern Great Plain
Production 457 845 66 3 361 871 50 5 207 670 32 6
of which: Manufacturing 181 156 61 2 151 607 47 4 114 710 29 6
 Tertiary 228 637 46 13 240 570 31 18 263 205 17 22
Total 686 482 60 6 602 441 43 10 470 875 23 15
Employed/population  (%) 47.0 44.7 34.3
Note: Data based on the national 1980, 1990 and 2001 census. Low educational attainment means eight grades of schooling or less. High educational attainiment means
completing tertiary or university education.
Source: Miklós Lakatos, head of department, and Mária Richter Hablicsek, chief counsellor, Central Statistical Office, Budapest.
Fgiure 19
Changes in the structure of the employed, by branches and qualifications, 1980 and 2001
1980 1990 2001
Hungary No. of em-
ployed
High educa-
tional at-
tainment
Low educa-
tional at-
tainment
No. of em-
ployed
High educa-
tional at-
tainment
Low educa-
tional at-
tainment
No. of em-
ployed
High edu-
cational
attainment
Low educa-
tional at-
tainment
Production 3 082 513 61 4 2 412 097 46 6 1 415 721 27 8
of which: Manufacturing 1 488 903 56 5 1 194 168 44 7 896 869 27 8
Tertiary 1 983 142 43 14 2 112 875 30 19 2 274 548 16 25
   of which: Financial activity
   and auxiliary services 30 562 18 11 45 524 11 16 69 678 5 31
Realty, renting, commercial 140 336 34 21 153 175 25 27 279 138 15 30
Public administration, defence, so-
cial insurance 195 406 37 18 250 998 24 24 279 789 13 29
Education 248 585 26 45 273 635 21 55 309 512 14 60
Health and welfare 189 166 44 16 235 575 33 20 241 636 21 23
Összesen 5 065 655 54 8 4 524 972 39 12 3 690 269 20 18
Note: Low educational attainment means eight grades of schooling or less. High educational attainiment means completing tertiary or university education.
Source: Census 1980, 1990, 2001. Miklós Lakatos, head of department, and Mária Richter Hablicsek, chief counsellor, Central Statistical Office, Budapest.
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Figure 21
Poverty indices
Uppermost Lowermost
decile as proportion of population 2/1Year
1 2 3
1987 4.5 20.9 4.6
1995 3.3 25.0 7.6
1997 2.9 26.7 9.2
Source: A szegénység… (2000), p. 31.
Figure 22
Risk indices for poverty
Type of settlement and region
Regional distribution of poverty-risk index,
1999–2000, based on membership of lowest income
decile
Budapest 0.34
Transdanubian county seats 0.46
Towns in Transdanubia and Pest County 0.82
Villages in Transdanubia and Pest County 1.49
Towns in North Hungary and Northern Great Plain 1.22
Villages in North Hungary and Northern Great Plain 1.89
Source: A szegénység… (2000), p. 75.
Figure 23
Numbers and average populations of regions in the European Union
NUTS 1 NUTS 2
Country No. Average population (’000) No. Average population (’000)
Austria 3 2686 9 895
Belgium 3 3386 11 923
Denmark 1 5262 1 5262
United Kingdom 12 4899 37 1589
Finland 2 2563* 6 854
France 9 6486 26 2245
Greece 4 2619 13 806
Netherland 4 3881 12 1294
Ireland 1 3634 1 3634
Luxembourg 1 416 1 416
Germany 16 5119 40 2047
Italy 11 5314 20 2923
Portugal 3 3309 7 1418
Spain 7 5667 18 2204
Sweden 1 8841 8 1105
Total EU 78 4802 210 1647
EU corrected** 73 4981 206 1810
Note:
* The figure is probably not correct. For special reasons, Finland treats the small island of Aaland as a greater re-
gion, so that NUTS 1 units range in population from 5.1 million down to 25,000.
** NUTS 1 without overseas territories. NUTS 2 without one greater region and four regions overseas: Guadeloupe,
Martinique, French Guiana és Réunion.
Source: EUROSTAT News Release No. 11/99, 9 February 1999, quoted in Kovács (1999), p. 110.
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